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ABSTRACT: While the mechanisms of apology, forgiveness and reconciliation receive considerable scru-
tiny, little attention has been afforded the non-apology. This counterfeit, confected typically by false substi-
tution or mis-direction, adds moral insult to moral wrong. The paper elucidates the normative structural 
relationship among apologiser, the apologetic disposition, and the apology and defends the view of the non-
apology as the pretended willingness to recalibrate the moral positional relationship among apologiser, 
wronged, and wrong without actually doing so. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Apologies used to be a personal affair and a rare occasion in the public lives of nations 
and institutions. There has been a change in sensibility and we are currently inundated by 
public apologies both individual and political. The apology is a powerful and constructive 
means of conflict resolution and a way of dealing with wrongdoing once it occurs. In 
addition to being a mechanism by which transgressors may hold themselves accountable, 
the apology has the capacity to overcome bitterness, divisiveness and resentment and 
hence transform relationships among individuals, groups and nations. It is a mechanism 
for ethical accountability that, when used responsibly, is “a mysterious potent symbolic 
act” that can “cleanse and heal social rifts” (Tavuchis 1991: 2). Once considered a sign of 
weakness the apology has emerged as a symbol of strength, a sign that one has the confi-
dence and humility to own up to mistakes since an apology cannot be offered from a po-
sition of moral superiority. But here lies the problem. 
 The road from transgression to reconciliation is long, arduous and treacherous. 
In recent years, the tilting balance of power towards formerly powerless individuals and 
communities have led them to assert their right to be treated as equals by those who had 
previously devalued them (Lazure 2004: 15). The prevalence of the non-apology is di-
rectly related to unwillingness on the part of the transgressor to give in to increased pres-
sure to apologise for his wrong-doing. Rather than the genuine article, a counterfeit, the 
duplicitous non-apology is offered instead; often adding moral insult to moral wrong. As 
such, non-apologies are an unwanted negative externality, “a catalyst for superficiality” 
that “contaminate[s] public discourse” (Kampf 2009: 13). Nevertheless, they are “elo-
quent testimony” to the power of the genuine apology since the offender is “trying to reap 
the benefits of apologizing without having actually earned them” (Lazure 2004: 9). 
 The apology is a moral mechanism for holding wrongdoers accountable as well 
as for extracting assurance that similar violations will not be undertaken by them in the 
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future. The apology is meant to restore the tarnished image of the transgressor as well as 
constitute a means of redressing the transgression and its effects. It is my argument that 
the apology itself can be understood as, in principle, an internally consistent mechanism 
with a number of different parts interacting in certain predictable ways. Explicating the 
inner workings of this mechanism and its various elements will afford insight into our 
apology-practices and the ethical obligations of wrongdoers. 
 Although my eye is on the political or official apology, in this paper I draw on 
the affinities between personal and political apologies and provide criteria for understand-
ing and evaluating them. I will restrict my comments to a robust form of the apology: the 
moral apology, one that is offered in response to transgressions of respect either by viola-
tions of moral standards or by moral insult. For Kampf, the key to the non-apology is a 
“manifest lack of sincerity” (Kampf 2009: 13). I unpack this insight by arguing that the 
non-apology, by disabling the apologetic disposition, is the pretended willingness to re-
calibrate the moral positional relationship among transgressor, wronged and wrong with-
out actually doing so.  
2. THE APOLOGY AS MECHANISM  
There are a cluster of concepts or devices that are used to facilitate the complex restora-
tive project of bringing a transgression to reconciliation, among them: mercy, pardon, 
forgiveness, apology, regret, truth-telling, atonement and restitution; none of which is 
strictly necessary, but a combination of which is usually needed to complete the project. 
The standard scenario is as follows. A profound wrong is inflicted by one upon another 
and the wronged (the cuckold spouse, the sexually assaulted, the racially recriminated, 
the betrayed, the genocide survivor, etc.) is created. Victimised by this profound wrong, 
the wronged invariably experiences outrage, anger and resentment and may respond to 
the wrong in a number of different ways including revenge, forgetting, forgiveness and 
reconciliation. The wronged who forgives voluntarily ameliorates resentment and for-
swears revenge thereby increasing the chances of reconciliation. And, he may be prompt-
ed to forgive by the transgressor’s offer of an apology.  
 Apologies are temporally complex mechanisms; which look to not only redress 
the past but also show concern for the future. This makes sense since the interests of the 
wronged are both backward-looking, requiring the offender to recognize and 
acknowledge the value of the loss experienced by the wronged and forward-looking, re-
quiring the transgressor to accept responsibility for future behaviour toward the wronged 
(Gill 2000: 17). The wronged is more likely to accept the apology if it contains acknowl-
edgements about the past, commitments about making practical amends and promises of 
no further repetition of such transgressions. Numerous commentators have offered crite-
ria for evaluating the “genuine,” (Lazare 2004), “categorical” (Smith 2004) or “sincere” 
(Govier 2006) apology. I shall follow Davies in labelling this regulative ideal the con-
summate apology. I have also adopted some of his terminology (Davies 2002). 
 The consummate apology is a concatenation of principals, attitudes, beliefs, in-
tentions and circumstances and has five distinct if overlapping elements unified, tempo-
rally, by acknowledgements about the past, commitments for the future and sentiments 
expressed in the apology. These five intermeshed elements are the doxastic, affective, 
structural, constative and dispositional.  
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 Typically, an apology involves taking causal responsibility for committing the 
transgression and should include a meta-understanding of the reasons for one’s transgres-
sive behaviour. The doxastic element of the apology thus involves beliefs held by the apol-
ogiser acknowledging that his transgression was unjustified as well as “the morally relevant 
features of the situation that made one’s performance transgressive” (Davies 2002: 170). 
 The affective element involves the apologiser displaying the appropriate emo-
tions and the right amount of self-reproach. Typically this involves feelings such as sor-
row and regret for causing the transgression and also involves a wish that the transgres-
sion could be undone. Among the cluster of cognitively tinged sentiments that are typi-
cally felt include embarrassment, chagrin, sorrow, regret, sympathy, empathy, shame, 
guilt, remorse, penitence and contrition. For some, the key driver of the apology’s trans-
formative power is this affective expression (Tavuchis 1991). Moreover, such sentiments 
matter because of the beliefs intertwined with them. 
 The apology is both an act and an accounting. As such, these doxastic and affec-
tive elements that the apologiser must display are matched, even if implicitly, by ele-
ments that the account of the apology must meet. As an account, the apology must con-
form to the formal or structural relationship among apologiser, wronged and wrong. The-
se are matters of form and of the positional relationship among apologiser, wrong and 
wronged being configured in appropriate ways. I will mention three. 
 One, the apology account is not conflated with or substituted by other sorts of 
accounts that share similarities with apology; in particular, excuse and justification. 
Simply put, in an apology one accepts responsibility for a state-of-affairs that one 
acknowledges as the result of a wrong one has done. In an excuse, one accepts the state-
of-affairs as wrong, but denies (degrees of) responsibility. In a justification, one accepts 
responsibility for the state of affairs but denies that the act was wrong. (Scott and Lyman 
1968: 46-48) Similarly, the phrase “I’m sorry” is semantically and syntactically ambigu-
ous. It does not always function as an expression of regret; for example, a person may 
express regret but not admit culpability or feel sorry; or, on the other hand, he may 
choose to regret the wrong that was caused, rather than express regret for the act that had 
caused the wrong. As such, attention has to be directed to ensure that the right sort of 
regret is connected in the appropriate way with the wrong and the causes of the wrong. 
  Two, the principals have standing and have the right positional relation to the 
wrong. In brief, this formal requirement is to ensure that the roles of apologiser and wronged 
are correctly connected together with the wrong and that only legitimate disputants (or their 
representatives) participate in the apology. There is no misdirection by apologising to the 
wrong party or for the wrong wrong (Lazure 2004: 101-105). The requirement is particularly 
contentious when the two roles are represented by stand-ins such as a spokesperson or a rep-
resentative of a group, although such complaints are practical not conceptual. 
 Three, there is no attempt to minimise or misdirect responsibility such that the 
appropriate amount of causal and moral responsibility is borne by those responsible and 
is directed at the right wrong and the right victim.  
 The historical record or the constative element is needed to flesh out the formal 
structure of the apology by adding precision and detail. There will invariably be contested 
facts surrounding the transgressive situation. This hazard is compounded by the tempta-
tion to obfuscate the nature of the wrong and, the identities of the transgressor and the 
wronged. Often, a factual record collaborated upon and mutually agreeable to the princi-
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pals will need to be established and may include the identification of each moral wrong 
and the social and cultural norms violated by the transgression(s) (Smith 2006: 480-482).  
 Ideally, these elements of the consummate apology would be internally con-
sistent and hence, the elements would serve as inner constraints for each other. For ex-
ample, the doxastic and constative elements may remain implicit (especially in personal 
apologies) or be the explicit result of a long process of negotiation (especially in official 
apologies). Similarly the affective element, say the expression of regret, has to conform 
to the formal constraints of the apology in that it has to be the expression of the right sort 
of regret in the right formal relationship with the wronged and the wrong. Still, formal, 
doxastic, affective and constative elements are insufficient to contrive a consummate 
apology. These elements are intimately connected with an acknowledgment that the 
wrong took place but, the apology is also necessarily future directed. There is a clear gap 
between expressing a sentiment and committing oneself to it and it is to this lacuna that 
the dispositional element is meant to address. What is needed in the consummate apology 
is a strong indication that the apologiser is disposed to affirm two sorts of commitments: 
one, the wronged must be given reasons that there will be no repetition of similar wrongs 
in the future (Gill 2000: 14); and two, that there is a commitment to make practical 
amends (Govier 2006: 69). 
3. THE APOLOGETIC DISPOSITION 
Since wrongs damage relationships, we expect apologisers to not only display appropriate 
emotions but to be also disposed to commit and undertake remedial action. This disposi-
tional element is about subsequent conduct and is associated with the notions of atone-
ment, restitution and reparation. Atonement is closely connected with the idea of personal 
transformation whereas reparation and restitution apply to the wronged and are intended 
to make a victim whole by returning what the offense has taken away. Restitution speaks 
specifically to returning something taken wrongfully while reparation is used to describe 
a form of recompense for more intangible losses (Smith 2006: 486).  
 Discerning dispositions as a way of affirming commitment on the part of the 
apologiser works better for the individual apology, but it gets increasingly dodgy when 
determining group commitment. At the individual level, the commitment to a less trans-
gressive future may require character examination and modification through the cultiva-
tion of new dispositions or the reshaping of existing ones. Consummate apologies thus 
draw attention to the transgressor’s character and identity not only to understand the mo-
tivation for the transgression but also to discern signs that the transgressor is disposed  
both to prevent repetition and to restore the moral balance by bringing the relationship or 
the community back into equanimity and harmony.  
 The apologetic disposition has three aspects that correspond in turn, to present, 
past and future: One, there is the present affirmation that the power differential between 
the positional roles of the transgressor and the wronged is in need of repositioning and 
that the apology would initiate this new position of moral equality; no consummate apol-
ogy can be offered from a position of superiority. Two, there is a commitment to restora-
tive reparation which is backward looking in its insistence that “reparation should restore 
the victim to her prior position” (Thompson 2002: 48). Compensation and restitution are 
key components to this aspect as their consequences, or lack of same, tend to be visible 
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and tangible. Three, there is a commitment to reconciliatory reparation which is forward 
looking in the sense that “it aims to achieve a good outcome now or in the future” 
(Thompson 2002: 48). This is the commitment to actually stop structuring the relation-
ship in terms of transgressor/transgressed roles.  
 By apologising, the transgressor seeks to redeem and rehabilitate his tarnished 
image as transgressor by projecting the image of a moral persona capable of and account-
able for moral interaction. But, if there is no real commitment to a future of moral parity 
then the apology is stillborn. The denial of the reconciliatory reparation aspect necessarily 
triggers the non-apology; the fraudulent apology offered in bad faith. This aspect is the 
nub of the non-apology. The non-apology is one offered under false pretenses by a 
feigned willingness to recalibrate the moral positional relationship. 
 There is no doubt that this cognitive dispositional element is opaque and difficult 
to discern. One common compensatory strategy is to glean from the other elements of the 
consummate apology indirect confirmation of the apologetic disposition and the reliance, 
perhaps over-reliance, on the affective element as the trigger that affirms and confirms 
this disposition to moral equality and respect. When an individual apologises in person, 
her delivery of the apology and the appropriate affective deportment provide data points 
for an overall assessment of the apology.  
 The other strategy is to use post-apology behaviour as a test of disposition or 
aptitude (Gill 2004: 14). Political apologies involve the public acknowledgement of 
wrongdoing by a political entity and tend to have a greater compass and complexity. Po-
litical wrongs are typically violations of communal and ethical conventions and public 
acknowledgement of the wrong and a willingness to repair the wrong may often be inad-
equate; political apologies must initiate the actual repairing of the communal conventions 
that have been violated and this repairing may play out in fits and starts. Hence it makes 
sense to downplay the immediacy of the affective element in group apologies.  
 Moreover, the efficacy of the affective element diminishes the more temporally 
distant the wrong and the larger the groups involved (especially when there has been a 
complete membership turnover.) An apology by a transgenerational polity, such as the 
state, concerning an intergenerational wrong does not appear to depend on affective states 
such as sorrow or remorse although an argument could be made that the appropriate emo-
tion should be shame for this blot on the historical record. Tavuchis notes that group 
apologies have little to do with sorrow or sincerity but with putting things on a public 
record (Tavuchis 1991: 117). 
 The official political apology is meant to separate a past of injustice and incon-
siderateness with a future of just dealings and respect (Thompson 2005: 10). Official 
apologies are heavily symbolic and hence they tend to be received tentatively and suspi-
ciously pending further clarification and ratification of commitments. It does suggest that 
there is an important relationship between the apologetic disposition and the cultivation 
of trust between the principals, but this is not the place to pursue that thought. 
 There is no guarantee that an apology will succeed. The wronged, even when 
offered a consummate apology may choose to decline; such is her prerogative. Similarly, 
a less than consummate apology may be deemed adequate and accepted. But if the reason 
an apology is challenged is because “It’s all words, nothing is going to change,” then it is 
a critical judgement of the apologetic disposition of the apologiser. If this analysis of the 
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apologetic disposition is accurate, we better understand the complaint and have a better 
understanding of how it can be met and assuaged.   
4. THREE EXAMPLES OF APOLOGIES 
The relationship between the bilateral, dyadic, poles of the apology vary all the way from 
the personal one-to-one, and one-to-many apology, to the group apology of the many-to-
one and the many- to-many. For Smith, personal one-to-one apologies have the best 
chance of being consummate apologies while collective or group apologies (especially 
group to group) are prone to failure; though importantly, on occasion may succeed (Smith 
2008: 155). In this section I discuss three apologies to demonstrate how attention in terms 
of the apologetic disposition abets the evaluation of the apology and its parasitical com-
plement, the non-apology. 
4.1 A Consummate Personal Apology: The Takashi Example 
An excellent example of a consummate apology was offered by Nagase Takashi. Eric 
Lomax, a World War II prisoner of war, writes in his memoir of being consumed by ha-
tred and vengeance until he received an apology nearly fifty years later and was able to 
forgive his torturer tormenter, Nagase Takashi. The steps taken by Takashi to demon-
strate his penance and his strive for atonement included the following: writing a short 
book reflecting upon his experiences including the remorse and shame that he felt while 
watching prisoners being beaten and also the categorical approach he took in acknowl-
edging his guilt; working with the War Graves Commission  in part to revisit and lay 
wreaths at the Allied cemetery; building a religious shrine; adopting an anti-militarist 
position; and setting up a charitable foundation for survivors of the Asian labour camps. 
When Takashi met Lomax at the Bridge over the River Kwai, he kept repeating “I am 
very, very sorry” (Lazure 2004: 242-248). 
 There is little doubt that Takashi’s apology qualifies as consummate. What 
makes it easy to confirm this judgement is that, unlike the typical apology, here, the apol-
ogetic disposition has already been confirmed in act and deed. Takashi both acknowledg-
es the wrongness of his actions and goes to remarkable lengths to atone for them by a 
change in character and a series of concrete actions.  
4.2 A Political Non-Apology: The de Klerk Example 
Things can get more complicated when you are talking of a political apology involving 
the public acknowledgement of wrongdoing by a political entity. Govier does an exquis-
ite job dismantling an insincere apology by the former president P.W. De Klerk before 
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission; an account which drove Des-
mond Tutu to tears and prompted a contemptuous rejection by the African National Con-
gress. Several aspects of the formal element of an apology were clearly not met. 
 One, De Klerk was evasive regarding responsibility for the wrongs committed 
by National Party governments, including his. While he acknowledged that wrongs had 
been perpetrated, he denied that the wrongs were the result of government policy. Two, 
his standing was questioned since it was unclear as to whether de Klerk was the spokes-
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man for the National Party, and, also unclear was the degree to which the National Party 
represented White South Africa. Three, he offered excuses. While expressing regret that 
atrocities had occurred, he did not apologize for them. “We abolished apartheid and we 
are proud of it,” he said, but did not concede that it was his Party that had brought in and 
maintained political segregation. De Klerk was clearly concerned to protect his public 
persona and the reputation of the National Party. He wanted to assume a position of pride 
for ending apartheid while refusing to acknowledge wrongs for which shame would be 
appropriate (Govier 2006: 77-79). 
 Significantly, de Klerk’s statement made no mention of future commitments to 
seek amends and hence was entirely devoid of a dispositional element. Counterfactually, 
even if the other elements of the consummate apology were to be met by de Klerk, his 
apology would still be a non-apology because there was no attempt to envisage and 
commit to a changed future for South Africa. 
4.3. The Australian Stolen Children Apology 
Nothing prevents the official political apology from being a consummate apology. Stand-
ing before victims and pronouncing the apology creates emotional and ceremonial mean-
ing, but an official written apology (perhaps accompanied by a treaty) is more like to sat-
isfy the requirements of a consummate apology (Smith 2006: 484). 
 In 2008 the Prime Minister of Australia formally apologised to the Australian 
Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders. The following excerpt is a good example of how a 
well crafted apology can address the three aspects of the apologetic disposition: 
We today take this first step by acknowledging the past and laying claim to a future that em-
braces all Australians. A future where this parliament resolves that the injustices of the past 
must never, never happen again ...  A future where we embrace the possibility of new solu-
tions to enduring problems where old approaches have failed. A future based on mutual re-
spect, mutual resolve and mutual responsibility. A future where all Australians, whatever 
their origins, are truly equal partners, with equal opportunities and with an equal stake in 
shaping the next chapter in the history of this great country, Australia ...  if the apology we 
extend today is accepted in the spirit of reconciliation, in which it is offered, we can today re-
solve together that there be a new beginning for Australia. And it is to such a new beginning 
that I believe the nation is now calling us. Australians are a passionate lot. We are also a very 
practical lot. For us, symbolism is important but, unless the great symbolism of reconciliation 
is accompanied by an even greater substance, it is little more than a clanging gong. It is not 
sentiment that makes history; it is our actions that make history. (CNN 2008) 
The process of repairing the damage caused by transgressive behaviour is always approx-
imate and emergent mainly because the social fabric of Australian society is not one easi-
ly configured. Nevertheless, the signs are encouraging. The apology deliberately recali-
brates the moral/trust relation from one that has become badly flawed to one of equality. 
There is a firm commitment for social and economic reparations. And, there is a firm 
acknowledgement of the need for and a commitment to establish a new more appropriate 
relationship whereby the moral infrastructure of Australian society is recalibrated and the 
wronged restored to a place in it as full and equal members. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
The apology is a patch for moral transgression. Wrongs damage relationships and we 
expect transgressors to not only apologise but to undertake remedial actions which in-
volve future commitments including reparations either in the form of debt restitution or 
moral transformation. Acts of disrespect cannot be undone, but they can be apologised 
for. A consummate apology is not simply a response to a wrong but also to an insult. It is 
to the moral insult that the apology’s dispositional element is directed. The failure to ad-
dress the insult in a future oriented manner renders the apology otiose. 
 Understanding the apology as an internally configured, temporally complex 
mechanism has its benefits. By understanding how it works we demystify the mysterious 
power of the apology to aid in the repair of relationships. This in turn allows for a deeper 
appreciation of its composite elements as well as an appreciation of how the mechanism 
can be disabled or dissembled. More importantly, it draws attention to a much neglected 
aspect of moral ontology; namely, the availability of moral mechanisms to respond posi-
tively to wrongdoing and to initiate repair.  As such, apologies also function as mecha-
nisms for social change (Gill 2000: 20) especially in transitions from a situation of injus-
tice to a situation of more humane and hopeful circumstances since a society “hospitable 
to public apology not only values speaking truth to power, but also power speaking truth 
to the less powerful” (Griswold 2007: 190). 
 Finally, successful consummate apologies may “raise the moral threshold of a 
society” (Brooks 1999: 3) because they promote positive externalities such as increased 
trust and mutual respect. It is in such a milieu that previously disempowered individuals 
and groups are using their elevated status to remind others of profound inequities and 
insult. “Apologies are a civilized way to redress these inequities” (Lazure 2004: 16); 
whereas the non-apology simply contributes to the cynicism of contrition chic. 
  
AN INFORMAL LOOK AT THE NON-APOLOGY 
9 
REFERENCES 
Brooks, Roy L. (ed.) (1999). When Sorry Isn’t Enough: The Controversy over Apologies and Reparations 
for Human Injustice. New York: New York University Press. 
CNN (2008). Full text of Australia’s apology to Aborigines. CNN.com February 12, 2008. From 
http://articles.cnn.com/2008-02-12/world/australia.text_1_stolen-generations-prime-minister-kevin-
rudd-indigenous-peoples?_s=PM:WORLD 
Davis, Paul (2002). On Apologies. Journal of Applied Philosophy 19(2), 169-173. 
Gill, Kathleen (2000). The Moral Functions of an Apology. Philosophical Forum 31(1), 11-27. 
Govier, Trudy and Verwoerd, Wilhelm (2002). Forgiveness: The Victim’s Prerogative. South African  
Journal of Philosophy 21(1), 97-111. 
Govier, Trudy (2006). Taking Wrongs Seriously: Acknowledgement, Reconciliation, and the Politics of 
Sustainable Peace. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books. 
Griswold, Charles L. (2007). Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 
Griswold, Charles L. (2008). Forgiveness and Apology: What, When, Why? Tikkun 23(2): 21.  
Kampf, Zohar (2009). Public (non)-Apologies: The Discourse of Minimizing Responsibility. Journal of 
Pragmatics 41(11), 2257-2270. 
Lazare, Aaron (2004). On Apology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Neu, Jerome (2008). Sticks and Stones: The Philosophy of Insults. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Nobles, Melissa (2008). The Politics of Official Apologies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pettigrove, Glen (2003). Apology, Reparations, and the Question of Inherited Guilt. Public Affairs  
Quarterly 17(4), 319-348. 
Radzik, Linda (2009). Making Amends: Atonement in Morality, Law, and Politics. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press. 
Scott, Marvin B. and Lyman, Stanford M. (1968). Accounts. American Sociological Review 33(1), 46-62. 
Smith, Nick (2005). The Categorical Apology. Journal of Social Philosophy 36(4), 473-496. 
Smith, Nick (2008). I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Tavuchis, Nicholas (1991). Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
Thompson, Janna (2002). Taking Responsibility for the Past: Reparation and Historical Justice.  
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 Zenker, F. (ed.). Argumentation: Cognition and Community: Proceedings of the 9th International Conference of the 
Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation(OSSA), May 18-21, 2011. Windsor, ON (CD ROM), pp. 1-3. 
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At a very general level human history might be understood as an on-going struggle to 
institutionalize our capacity to recognise universal life-interests. That we can recognise 
these life-interests is proven by the existence of universal moral codes, secular or reli-
gious, solidaristic social and political movements that cross markers of empirical differ-
ence, and the millions-times multiplied quotidian friendly interactions between people. 
That institutionalizing this common life-interest is a struggle is proven by the structures 
of oppression, alienation, and exploitation into which some human groups have been and 
continue to be forced to subsist in material denial of what recognition of their humanity 
demands. Struggles are not static events but dynamic processes, they advance and retreat, 
achieve new plateaus of development or fall off cliffs of defeat. In all cases, struggles 
presuppose division and opposition between different groups of people; they objectively 
refute ideologies of essential unity of social interest and commitment to shared goals. If, 
nevertheless, the possibility of unity is real, as is proven by real successes in overcoming 
the instituted violence of oppression, then the question of how formerly opposed 
groups—the oppressed and their oppressors—can relate such that society can be recon-
structed on the basis of normative unity must be posed. I read Daniel’s paper on the struc-
ture of public apology as an attempt to pose and to answer this question. 
 Daniel sets out to analyse the internal structure of apologies not simply for the 
sake of clarifying an abstract problem of classification—what is the structural difference 
between a sincere and a false apology.  Rather, the structural interrogation is undertaken 
for the sake of advancing the practical goal of restoring or creating social unity where it 
has been violated by a history of systematic oppression. The paper is admirably to the 
point, well-crafted, and lucidly argued, but politically important too. I agree with the gen-
eral conclusion that Daniel draws: that sincere public apologies are capable of repairing 
the moral fabric of society where it has been riven by oppression and organized violence. 
My main interest in the argument, as these introductory comments make clear, lies in the 
underlying normative implications of this conclusion as well as certain metaphysical is-
sues these conclusions raise. My comments will focus on two general problems that Dan-
iel’s conclusion raises, rather than particular argumentative or interpretative moves the 
paper makes. I want to ask, first, whether there is an obligation on the part of oppressed 
to accept sincere public apologies. Second, I want to ask whether there are not cases of ex-
traordinary political crime for which accepting even a sincere apology would be immoral. 
 Daniel argues, and I agree, that public apologies are “powerful and constructive 
means of conflict resolution” because they can “cleanse and heal social rifts” (p.1). If 
they are to heal social rifts not only must they be honestly proffered, but they must be 
accepted. Daniels’ seems to assume that an honestly proffered apology will as a matter of 
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fact be accepted. The historical evidence cited seems to bear out this assumption. What is 
left unasked is whether those to whom the apology is made have an obligation to accept it. 
 Let us put that question another way in order to probe its implications further. 
Why ought systematically victimised groups accept even a sincere apology combined 
with material compensation, as opposed to, for example, rejecting it in favour of concert-
ed political struggle to permanently remove from power those who orchestrated the 
crimes? One answer is pragmatic: the politics of revenge make for on-going instability 
and on-going instability makes everyone’s life worse off. The socially destructive racial 
politics of Zimbabwe might be cited as a paradigm example. Pragmatically speaking 
there might be good reasons for the victims of oppression to accept an apology and con-
centrate their energies on building a better future for everyone. Nevertheless, this prag-
matic reason does not answer the moral question.  
 From the deeper normative perspective that interest me I can think of no grounds 
external to the victims upon which an obligation on their part to accept an apology could 
be grounded. Since the victims of crime owe the perpetrators nothing, and since obliga-
tions are, in a sense, debts owed to the other to whom one is obliged, the victims have no 
obligation to accept even an apology sincerely offered. If this is true, then accepting an 
apology and moving forward in a new spirit of unity is always a superogatory act on the 
part of the historical victims of oppression. 
 This conclusion, although somewhat beyond the scope of Daniel’s paper, is 
nonetheless important to the more general philosophical-political issues upon which it is 
focussed. It seems to me that too often the group that apologises is morally lauded for 
agreeing to stop brutalising and oppressing the victims, while the victims who accept the 
apology are treated as if accepting the apology was only doing what was morally ex-
pected of them. However, it is really the group that is willing not to insist on the violent 
justice of revenge that allows the social fabric to be knit together anew.  
 This willingness to set aside the violent justice of revenge raises a further ques-
tion: whether there are some cases where accepting a public apology would in fact be 
immoral. In other words, are there some crimes which are so egregious that the perpetra-
tors permanently exclude themselves from the human family? How indeed can world 
historic crimes like the Holocaust or the brutal colonization and destruction of indigenous 
life-ways be redeemed through an apology, no matter how sincere? In cases such as these 
it was the intention of the perpetrators to completely annihilate life-ways and the lives of 
those who lived them because those lives and life-ways were impediments to the particu-
lar interests of a ruling group presiding over a life-blind social system. Apologies seem to 
require some degree of equal moral standing.  In cases of truly extraordinary moral crime, 
precisely this equality of moral standing is absent. Instead of apology and acceptance, the 
morally relevant duty in these cases seems to me to be the destruction of the social fabric 
that produced the inhumanity and the weaving of a new one that permanently excludes 
the perpetrators and anyone who would sympathise or excuse their actions. 
 Thus, in cases of extraordinary political crime I am not certain that just under-
standing the inner structure of argument, important as this is, provides sufficient insight 
into “ethical obligations of wrongdoers.” (p. 2) In these sorts of cases apology would 
seem to be part of the wrongdoing rather than the first step towards reconciliation—a 
kind of moral category mistake in which the perpetrator completely misunderstands the 
enormity of the violation by believing that apology is appropriate. I thus agree in general 
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with Daniel that apology can “redeem and rehabilitate” (p. 5) the moral standing of the 
perpetrator of political crimes, but worry that there are systematic forms of inhumanity 
that are beyond redemption and rehabilitation.  
